Scholarship on the no-self (anātman) doctrine in Buddhism has predominantly focused on the Indian context, often overlooking significant variations within the history of Chinese Buddhism. This may due to scholars’ partial view that the “self” doctrine, the ātmavāda, is central to Chinese Buddhist thought, such as tathagatagarbha/Buddha-nature thought, rather than the concept of “no-self.” However, a more historically informed and philosophically sophisticated examination reveals that concept of “no-self” persists in Chinese Buddhism, albeit with distinct interpretations. While sharing the terminology no-self (skt. anātman; Ch. wuwo 無我) in Chinese translations, the Chinese approach departs significantly from the primarily ontological emphasis of Indian Buddhism, exhibiting instead an epistemological orientation. This dissertation investigates the significance, characteristics, evolution, and hermeneutics of the “no-self” doctrine in Ming Dynasty Buddhism, focusing on the influential monk Zibo Zhenke (紫柏真可, 1543-1604). Zibo’s understanding of “no-self” is presented as a cognitive model of non-duality between self and other, contrasting with the standard Indian Buddhist definition as the denial of an unchanging, eternal self.
This study argues that one of the key factors for the philosophical transformation of the “no-self” doctrine in Ming Dynasty was the result of Buddhist response to the non-Buddhist criticism coming particularly from the Yangmingists. This study of the “no-self” doctrine expounded by Zibo is primarily an attempt to reveal the complexity of the philosophical and intellectual arena complemented and competed among the “three teachings”, i.e., Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Moreover, a thorough and meticulous study no-self doctrine expounded by Zibo, in my view, should contribute to broader and diverse philosophical discussions of the no-self doctrine in Buddhism in general, and in Chinese Buddhism in particular.