Comprehending everything as oneself. The non-self doctrine of Zibo Zhenke in Ming dynasty buddhism

會萬物為一己:明代佛教的紫柏真可的無我教義
Start - End 
2025 - 2028 (ongoing)
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Department of Languages and Cultures
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Department of Buddhist Studies, Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts
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Intellectual history
History of ideas
Chinese Buddhism

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates the significance, characteristics, evolution, and hermeneutics of the doctrine of “non-self” (Skt. anātman; Ch. wuwo 無我) in Ming-dynasty Buddhism, with a focus on the deeply influential monk Zibo Zhenke (紫柏真可, 1543–1604). The “Self” (Skt. ātman) criticized in the mainstream discourse of Indian Buddhism is a metaphysical Self that persists along the dimension of time; what Zibo's “non-self” negates is something different. This dissertation defines it as what I term the “oppositional self”: the illusory subject constructed through the perceiver’s reflexive self-cognition of itself as a cognizing subject set in opposition to its cognized object. This “self” finds a comparable concept in Indian Buddhism, namely, the Yogācāra notion of the “grasper” (Skt. grāhaka), yet in India this was not directly regarded as the ātman to be negated.

This dissertation argues that Zibo’s case reveals the inapplicability of various previous models of Buddhism’s development in China and its relationship to Indian Buddhism. First, Zibo still treats “non-self” as an important doctrine rather than a marginal one. Second, the “self” he negates is nevertheless not the Indian ātman, and his teaching is therefore not a doctrine of “non-self” in the strict sense. Third, he is still discussed within the Yogācāra structure of consciousness, with its bifurcation into grasper and grasped, rather than articulating "non-self" from within the context of Confucian ethics; his position therefore cannot simply be regarded as a product of “sinification.”

This complexity in fact reflects the dominant position of tathāgatagarbha thought in late-Ming Buddhism, as well as late-Ming Buddhists' engagement with the issue of “selflessness” (Ch. wusi 無私) in Yangmingism, that is, Zibo’s attempt to put forward a Buddhist version of a “non-self” as a path to sagehood. This demonstrates the different roles that “non-self” plays in different contexts: in India, as a wedge issue; in the late Ming, as a semantic field shared between Confucianism and Buddhism.

本論文考察明代佛教「無我」(Skt. anātman)教義的意義、特質、演變與詮釋學,聚焦於明代具有深遠影響的僧侶紫柏真可(1543–1604)。印度佛教主流論述所批判的「我」(Skt. ātman)是一個在時間維度上持存的形上學自我(metaphysical Self);紫柏的「無我」所否定的則有所不同——本論文將之界定為「相待我」(oppositional self),即一個在認知經驗分裂為能知與所知的二元對立中生起、並隨此對立消解而去除的認知主體之反身感。這種「我」能在印度佛教中找到類似的概念,即瑜伽行派的「能取」(Skt. grāhaka),但這在印度並不直接被視為要否定的ātman

本文認為,紫柏的案例揭示了過往諸種對於佛教在中國的發展及其與印度佛教的關係的模型的不適用性。一方面,紫柏仍舊視「無我」為重要的教義,而非邊緣化。二方面,他所否定的「我」卻又不是印度的ātman,因此不是嚴格意義上的「無我」教義。三方面,他仍舊是在瑜伽行派的能、所二分的意識結構中被討論,而非從儒家的倫理學語境去論述「無我」,因此不能簡單地視為「中國化」的產物。

這種複雜性其實反映了晚明佛教的如來藏思想的主導地位,以及明末佛教徒對於陽明學關於「無私」議題的介入,即紫柏嘗試提出一種佛教版本的「無我的成聖之道」。這展現了「無我」在不同脈絡中所扮演的不同角色——在印度作為楔子議題(wedge issue),在晚明作為儒佛之間共享的語義場(semantic field)。

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Weijen Teng

Department of Buddhist Studies - Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts