This proposal aims to defend the existence of emotional memory and to re-explain it by incorporating it into the developing metaphysics of memory. It starts by disclosing the traditional causal theory assumption behind the current debate on the existence of emotional memory, and pointing out the weakness of this assumption: the traditional causal theory of emotional memory cannot explain why we have different emotional memories to a single past and is threatened by empirical evidence. There are three alternatives to go beyond the traditional causal theory. First, the new causal theories revise the causal theory of the representation to accommodate the empirical. Second, simulation theory suggests that memory is produced by a properly functioning episodic construction system, rather than the encoding, storing, and retrieval causal process. Third, the enactivist account suggests that memory is the subject re-enacting and simulating the brain and body procedures involved in the past experience. We need to incorporate these new metaphysics of memory into emotional memory discussions. The research objectives and the methodology revolve around integrating emotional memory into the three trends of the new metaphysics of memory, using philosophical theories of explanatory power to compare the explanatory virtues of each explanation, and finding the best explanation or developing an optimal explanation by combining pieces of the three accounts.